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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INDUCING A REMEDY OR COURTING A SOLUTION? A
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE P2P
DILEMMA

I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court proposed the latest resolution to
peer-to-peer (P2P) copyright infringement in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.1 The Court held that Grokster could be secondarily liable
for the copyright infringement of its users, even if the software was capable of
substantial non-infringing uses.2 The Court had granted certiorari in Grokster
to clear legal misconceptions lower courts had developed in offering their own
solutions.3
These misconceptions first began with A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
in which the Ninth Circuit held Napster liable for secondary copyright
infringement by utilizing its own judicially crafted criteria.4 Three years later,
the Ninth Circuit, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.,
absolved Grokster, which offered Napster-compliant file sharing software, of
any wrongs associated with copyright infringement by applying its previously
established criteria found in Napster.5 Copyright holders were furious,
especially because the Ninth Circuit’s Grokster decision arrived at a different
conclusion than the Seventh Circuit, which had applied its own unique
interpretation of the law in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,6 even though all
three companies—Napster, Grokster, and Aimster—distributed software that
allowed the direct infringement of copyrights.7
Surely academics will debate the substantive merits of the Court’s most
recent decision, but, as many copyright and intellectual property enthusiasts
are aware, the Court’s decision was only the latest proposed adaptation to
copyright law. Before the Court stepped in to remedy this quagmire, Sen.

1. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
2. Id. at 2780; see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 442 (1984).
3. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775.
4. 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
5. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158–60, 1164,
1166 (9th Cir. 2004).
6. 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
7. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158; Aimster, 334 F.3d. at 645; Napster 239 F.3d at 1013.
851
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Orrin Hatch introduced legislation designed to negate and neutralize the
implications of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Grokster.8 By introducing the
Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004 (the Induce Act),9 Hatch
reacted to the swelling of dissension emanating from the copyright industry in
the aftermath of the Ninth Circuit’s disposition of the Grokster case.10
Ferociously advocated for by “copyright holders,” the Induce Act was also
diametrically opposed by other interests—those that disapproved of this
proposed application of an additional form of secondary liability to P2P
software providers.11 This loosely formed group, including “innovators” and
“Internet users,” with their recent victory in hand in the Ninth Circuit, kept the
copyright holders at bay by stalling the legislation until the end of the
congressional session, even though copyright holders ultimately received a
favorable ruling in the Supreme Court’s decision.12
What is largely ignored is the process by which these groups shifted this
conflict from the courts, to the legislature, back to the courts, and perhaps back
to the legislature—a seemingly ineffective method to influence the evolution
of copyright law. Group behavior, when examined within a law-making
context, receives substantial academic attention, specifically from cross-over
political scientists and economists.13 The evolution of this thought culminates
in public choice theory, which analyzes government and group action and
interaction through the basic assumptions of economics,14 hypothesizing that
groups will maximize their benefits while deflating costs.15 A myriad of
methods are used to increase benefits and decrease costs, but all of these
methods are affected by the particular institution that the group decides to
operate under; a phenomenon central to comparative institutional analysis,
which seeks to determine the most efficient institution to target for a favorable
policy solution.16
Comparative institutional analysis can be used in a predictive manner by
forecasting the “different outcomes that will arise in various institutional
settings based on the actors’ incentives in each setting,”17 as well as in a
normative manner, by determining the institution that should be utilized by

8. 150 CONG. REC. S7189 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
9. S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
10. 150 CONG. REC. S7192 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
(1991) [hereinafter FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW].
15. See id. at 14–15.
16. Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 575 (2001).
17. Id.
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groups to attain a particular social goal, but nonetheless requires choices based
on the costs and the benefits of the actions necessary to influence different
institutions.18
This Note seeks to examine, through a comparative institutional analysis,
the utilization of certain institutions by these disparate interests, and to make
an assessment as to which particular institution would be best suited to
maximize these groups’ resources in their battle for the proper standard for
secondary liability of copyright infringement. In Part II, this Note will
examine public choice theory and its evolution generally, and then, more
specifically, the tenets of comparative institutional analysis. Part III will
discuss the controversy surrounding Grokster and the Induce Act,
concentrating on the actions of the opposing groups, and how their interactions
led to the demise of effective legislative bargaining. Finally, Part IV will
examine the institutions utilized by the factions and will conclude by arguing
that the current legislative and judicial battles forced by copyright holders
actually led to the inefficient uses of their resources.
II. THE INSTITUTIONS
Comparative institutional analysis “predicts the different outcomes that
will arise in various institutional settings based on the actors’ incentives in
each setting . . . [and] chooses the best institution by determining the outcome
that best furthers a particular social policy goal.”19 Neil Komesar’s
“participation-centered approach” to comparative institutional analysis is
instructive because it focuses on the actions of the participants20 and assumes a
“number of plausibly efficient scenarios.”21 These scenarios only become
possible when interested parties advocate for a particular goal, and will only do
so in a particular forum where the benefits outweigh the costs.22 Certain
institutions, such as the legislature, the market, and the courts, allocate
different benefits, which require differing costs, and therefore, the choice of
the respective institution becomes an important decision for motivated actors.
A.

The Legislature

The study of the effects of groups on our political process is by no means a
modern discourse; indeed, our constitutional structure was designed to limit the
power of factions, to keep any group from demanding a disproportionate

18. Id.
19. Id.; see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
20. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 97.
21. Id. at 28.
22. Freiwald, supra note 16, at 576.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

854

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:851

amount of political power, which would thwart our young democracy.23 This
distrust of factions and its corresponding minoritarian influence has influenced
some thinkers, while others perceive this minoritarian influence as promoting
democracy.24
Interest group theorists, when hypothesizing about the effects of interest
groups and their corresponding minoritarian influence, generally argue that
these groups either promote democracy, by operating under the tenets of
pluralism, or limit democracy, as theorized by economists.25 Pluralism, in
conceptualizing that “power is widely dispersed among many separate groups,
all held in check by the public and by each other,”26 perceives group pressure
as resulting in the promotion of democratic values.27 Implicit in this theory are
certain assumptions about the formation of groups and the group behavior
itself that help to deconstruct group tendencies and analyze the distribution of
power that culminates in the democratic passage of legislation. A major
assumption of pluralism is that power is dispersed among many groups, with
coalitions of groups operating in distinct areas of policy making.28
Part of the reason for this dispersal of power . . . is that many different
resources of power exist in our society . . . wealth, expertise, access to the
media, prestige, position in a major institution—each of which may be decisive
in one area but not in others.29

23. Fears of the effects of interest groups were present even before the Constitution was
ratified. In a series of articles, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay anonymously
editorialized in support of the proposed Constitution. In the tenth article, Madison wrote:
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens . . . that
our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of
rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice
and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics
and Judicial Behavior: Macey’s Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 184 (1991).
24. I am not attempting to say which theory is right, or even that the following discussion
and analysis will be guided by any one theory exclusively. Rather, the following discussion of
interest group theory generally highlights several incidents within the peer-to-peer (P2P)
filesharing debate that are instrumental to choosing a particular institution as the most desirable
from a group perspective.
25. Beermann, supra note 23, at 188–97. Beermann states: “Public choice theory depends
most fundamentally on the assumption that government officials, parties regulated by
government, and all private citizens, when they engage in political activity, are acting out of selfinterest and not altruistically.” Id. at 188; see also FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW, supra note 14, at
13–14.
26. JANET A. FLAMMANG ET AL., AMERICAN POLITICS IN A CHANGING WORLD 140 (1990).
27. See id. at 155.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Thus, although a group may not be well financed, it may have a large number
of members, or it may have a membership that is well-respected in a particular
field.
But these resources themselves do not translate into legislative success.
Ideally, “representatives would measure the will of the people as expressed
through groups and direct public policy in accordance with their best estimate
of overall societal sentiment.”30 Nevertheless, government actors must have
some incentive to listen to one group over another; the resources a group can
offer make it influential with lawmakers.31 Groups that represent a large
number of members can aid the legislator in re-election by promising favorable
portrayal within the group, which would theoretically translate into votes.32
Groups that have large coffers can offer the legislator, or withhold from him or
her pending cooperation, large amounts of money to finance reelection
campaigns.33
Implicit in maintaining the “balance of the system” is an inherent
competition between groups. According to pluralists, even if a group has more
resources than a competing group, that competing group will, by necessity,
reorganize to an extent to restore balance to the system thereby maintaining
certain necessary democratic principles.34 Assuming groups have a resource
that is important to legislators, like money from wealthy groups or electoral
support from highly populated groups, each group then possesses a finite
amount of influence on the legislative process. Through bargaining and
compromise, facilitated by the legislators and other governmental officials, the
groups wield their power only as much as a competing group allows.35
Also important to the balance of the system is a group’s relative
accessibility to the political process, especially when a group feels strongly
about an issue.36 The theory assumes that when a particular group is too
powerful, another group will form to offset the original group’s power and

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Beermann, supra note 23, at 191.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See ROBERT L. LINEBERRY ET AL., GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND
POLICY 218 (2d ed. 1995).
35. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 10–11 (3d ed. 1997); see also
DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC
OPINION 534 (1953) (“Such partisan activities . . . consist of aid to candidates for Congress even
in districts where the formal members of these groups are few. Such efforts may eventually
create a situation in which legislators are responsible to more than a purely local constituency.”).
Generally, as used here, a competing group is one that takes an opposite position to a group that is
promoting some policy change.
36. See W. LANCE BENNETT, INSIDE THE SYSTEM: CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND POWER IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 21 (1994).
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influence, thus maintaining a democratic check on any one group’s ability to
implement a comprehensive design.37
Empirical studies supported these conceptions of group behavior. In 1935,
E. E. Schattschneider, in analyzing the Smoot–Hawley Tariff of 1930,
concluded that participating groups’ economic objectives largely shaped the
ensuing legislation.38 Robert Dahl, in his study of New Haven politics, found
pluralist theory helpful in analyzing the behavior of various groups and
political leaders as there was no one group that dominated the political
process.39
Later developments in the political arena, however, led to the questioning
of certain tenets of pluralism, including the democratic assumption of equal
access to power.40 Pluralism, holding true to democratic principles, demands
that “government is open to new groups who enter the competition for
power . . . all groups have equal chance to compete effectively . . . and . . .
people can organize effectively and be heard when they feel their interests are
on the line.”41 Several real-world events suggested otherwise. “The civil
rights movement . . . made it all too clear that blacks were wholly outside the
normal workings of the political system. . . . [T]he inadequacy of pluralist
theory to explain the position of blacks in society became increasingly
evident.”42 It was apparent to social science theorists that pluralism did not
account for the excessive privilege and governmental influence of particular
interest groups.43
Interest group liberalism, a pluralist-based theory that attempted to plug the
holes left in the previous conception of pluralism, “sees as both necessary and
good a policy agenda that is accessible to all organized interests and makes no
independent judgment of their claims. . . . [I]t defines the public interest as a
result of the amalgamation of various claims.”44 Building on the assumptions
of interest groups and their key role in the formulation of policy, interest group
liberalism’s analysis emphasized that “the role of government is one of
insuring access to the most effectively organized, and of ratifying the
agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing leaders.”45

37. See FLAMMANG ET AL., supra note 26, at 159, 164; see also BENNETT, supra note 36, at
21; LINEBERRY ET AL., supra note 34, at 218.
38. See E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF 16–17, 288–89
(1935).
39. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY (1961).
40. See id. at 1 (referring to American beliefs in democracy and equality).
41. See BENNETT, supra note 36, at 21 (emphasis omitted).
42. BERRY, supra note 35, at 13.
43. See id. at 14.
44. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 51 (2d ed. 1979).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
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Toward these ends, the relationship between the government and the groups
often becomes too intimate: since the legislators cannot choose a solution to a
problem, because they rely on the competing groups for resources like money
or votes, policy stagnation often results.46 Thus, if the competing groups
cannot fashion a solution, a solution will, theoretically, not be had.
These attempts to mold a theory to best fit those events that occurred in the
political world while keeping its democratic gloss intact eventually led to the
demise of these pluralist theories.47 Increasingly, political scientists began to
challenge the basic democratic belief that groups were at the center of political
decision-making.48 By the late 1950s, it seemed that many groups were
“underfinanced, poorly organized, overworked, and often counterbalanced by
each other’s efforts. . . . [T]he lobbyist functioned more as a ‘service bureau’
for legislators than as an ‘agent of direct persuasion.’”49 Instead of scrapping
interest group theory altogether, however, economists re-focused the
discussion by postulating that economic realities cause groups to operate antidemocratically.50
The formation of legislation from an economic perspective is best
understood when “legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other
goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the
greatest value from it, regardless of overall social welfare . . . .”51 The means
with which legislative goods are acquired consist of promises for electoral
support, financial support, or informational support, much like the pluralists
had hypothesized.52
Public choice theory emphasizes the role of the interest group, assuming
that since the rational legislator mostly desires to get re-elected, it is the
interest group that offers comparatively more benefits than a competing group
that emerges victorious, often with anti-democratic results.53 But there are

46. See LINEBERRY ET AL., supra note 34, at 220.
47. See generally Beermann, supra note 23, at 189–90.
48. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 884–85 (1987).
49. Id. at 885–86.
50. Id.
51. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).
52. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230 (1986). Certainly, large
groups have many members who ideally vote for politicians who support their views. See id.
Wealthy groups are able to not only make campaign contributions, but also to employ legislators
for speaking engagements and sometimes just make outright bribes. See id.
53. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW, supra note 14, at 23. However, this model negates the role of
the voter, postulating that “[b]ecause voters don’t know much about a legislator’s conduct,
elections may turn on financial backing, publicity, and endorsements. . . . [This theory] assume[s]
that ideology, defined simply as individual beliefs about the public interest, influences neither
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costs associated with group formation and these groups’ subsequent wielding
of influence, mainly information and transaction costs.
The initial transaction cost of any group is the initial influx of capital
necessary to ensure group formation.54 Specifically, transaction costs “are the
costs of organizing these similarly situated individuals into effective political
coalitions.”55 Group formation is closely followed chronologically by group
organization, which requires the identification of members who share the
group’s position, and then education of those members when potentially
harmful legislation is proposed.56 Then, groups must acquire information on a
particular issue and information on how to influence the legislative process.
“The more complex and extensive the political process, the more difficult it is
to understand its rules and discover its channels of influence—both formal and
informal.”57
Not only are there certain costs associated with group formation, but
certain obstacles must be overcome through the expenditure of additional
resources. Mancur Olson, in his seminal work on the free-rider dilemma,
posited that the average person is not likely to actually influence political
decisions,58 as the majority of people do not possess the resources to actually
influence political outcomes.59 “While large groups of relatively impecunious
individuals might theoretically pool their resources to defeat the wealthier
interests, the costs of organizing will usually outweigh the potential benefits of
the influence sought.”60 The group must convince the previously located
individuals that their action and support is imperative to the common goal.
Another impediment to group formation is the irrationality of pursuing
benefits derived from public policy.61 “Most public policies are public goods,
that is, once a policy is produced, everyone, not just participants in the political
process, is free to enjoy the benefits of the policy.”62 This in turn destroys
most incentive for participation in influential groups, as it is often difficult to
restrict the benefits to only the members of the group, and thus creates the free
rider problem.63 “[V]oluntary groups will not organize around policies that
affect large numbers of individuals . . . [g]roup membership will not, therefore,

voters nor legislators. . . . [S]elf-interest is the exclusive causal agent in politics.” Id. at 23–24.
54. Macey, supra note 52, at 229.
55. Id.
56. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 71–72.
57. Id.
58. See Beermann, supra note 23, at 194 (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 194–95.
62. Id. at 195.
63. Beermann, supra note 23, at 195.
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represent democracy in any relevant sense, but will instead reflect interests that
happen to be able to overcome the impediments to organizing.”64 Overall, preexisting groups of like-minded individuals will more effectively influence the
political process than otherwise dispersed individuals.65
Information costs also must be taken into consideration when evaluating
the effectiveness of group formation or issue involvement. Information costs
are “incurred by an individual or group in the process of discovering the
impact of an issue on the wealth of that individual or group, as well as the costs
of identifying similarly situated individuals or groups who are likely to share
the costs of obtaining political action.”66
Groups attempting to influence a legislator on a particular issue must incur
the costs of educating the legislator on the group’s position.67 Controlling the
flow of information benefits not only the legislator, by giving justifications for
a particular policy position, but the group itself. Particularly, interest groups,
especially when dealing with complex legislation, are able to “distort” the
thinking of the legislator by providing information supportive of the group’s
policy goal.68 It follows then that groups that have already organized are again
in an advantageous position when compared to those groups that must incur
substantial transaction and information costs to support or oppose particular
legislation.69
However, information costs vary depending upon the targeted institution.
For instance, the structural characteristics of the institution, such as “size and
population of the jurisdiction, size of the legislature (number of legislators),
frequency of election, size and scope of the legislative agenda, and the rules of
the legislature (and agencies),” have an impact on how a group will expend its
resources.70
Since resources are limited, there is a threshold amount that groups will
“pay” for particular legislation. Assuming that groups are pursuing public
policies that do not cost them more in taxes or any other sort of wealth, groups
will strive for a policy benefit that exceeds their costs, which is known as

64. Id. at 195.
65. Macey, supra note 52, at 229. This is not to say that large groups cannot be effective.
The main assumption of public choice theory is that political actors behave rationally. If certain
members of a group are funding the group, and the desired policy is a collective good, i.e., a good
shared by a large number of people, those members of the group will be spending more resources
than they are receiving, which, discounting ideological fervor, is an irrational behavior. See
FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW, supra note 14, at 23.
66. Macey, supra note 52, at 229.
67. Id. at 230–31.
68. Id.
69. Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market
Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 47 (1988).
70. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 73.
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“rent-seeking.”71 Accordingly, the higher the benefit to the group, the more
the group will be willing to spend. “Rent seeking is the purposeful pursuit,
through the political process, of above-normal profits. By engaging in rentseeking activities, private parties ‘compete for artificially contrived
transfers.’”72 Those groups will continue to “pay” legislators up to the amount
of the total benefit of the legislation, or to the point where the group is no
longer making a profit on the transaction, thereby defeating their attempt to
rent-seek.73 Therefore, rational legislators acting in their self interest will
advance particular legislation from groups that have low transactional and
informational costs and tend to ignore those groups whose costs are relatively
higher, as they will theoretically be less effective.74
Komesar’s conception of group interaction focuses intently on the
resources of the group and negates the interest of the legislator—as the
legislator, either self-interested or publicly interested, will always react to
group pressure.75 As such, Komesar posits that a well-organized and wellinformed small group will be more influential than a poorly organized and a
poorly formed large group regardless of the legislator’s interests; but, when
“the majoritarian influence grows, we can get a countervailance of sorts
between the two forces and, with it, political outcomes that are more
‘balanced’ than predicted by a model that focused on only [minority
groups].”76
B.

The Market

The market, like the political system, serves as an avenue for the
achievement of social goals or interests.77 “As with the political process, this
focus on the mass of participants hardly suggests that all participants are
created equal. Some people or entities participate more or more effectively.”78
71. Michael E. DeBow, The Social Costs of Populist Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective,
14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 214 (1991).
72. Id. at 214–15.
73. Id. Surely, legislators can act in a way not consistent with powerful groups; Komesar
refers to it as “slippage.” KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 57.
74. Macey, supra note 52, at 230.
75. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 64.
76. Id. at 75. But, “[w]here minoritarian influence predominates . . . the resulting broadbased legislation may be illusory.” Id.
Mobilizing for political action often prompts opposing groups to mobilize in opposition.
The ultimate outcome is often no action, or a messy compromise that is not terribly
satisfactory, or even a result that leaves the group that moved first worse off than it was
before it attempted to secure political action.
Howard S. Erlanger & Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 959, 978 (1997).
77. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 98.
78. Id. at 99.
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Use of the market requires significant transaction costs, as compared to the
relative benefits received by the participants.79 Transaction costs are
significantly dominated by information costs, which include the costs of
acquiring and understanding essential information.80 Many of the same
information costs discussed earlier apply, as groups attempting to solve a
problem must first recognize the problem, determine the best solution to a
problem, and then finally implement that solution.81 Other pertinent decisions
include “the choice whether to subcontract an activity or to internalize it in a
firm via vertical or conglomerate integration” and the process of distributing
the goods or services.82
The large numbers of participants necessary to reach a solution often make
the minimization of transaction costs and the maximization of benefits
difficult, as several intermediaries must usually be dealt with in bringing goods
to a market.83 “[E]ven with a very confined distribution of impacts, the costs
of transacting are not negligible and might deter either party from
transacting. . . .”84
However, much like groups in the legislature, groups in the market can
rent-seek. For example, advertising can be used to differentiate otherwise very
similar products, producing artificial monopolies to the extent that the cost of
the advertising does not exceed the benefits to the brand.85 As such, however,
“these efficiency losses due to monopoly may well be dwarfed by the
efficiency losses caused by the waste of resources expended on the advertising
used to create these monopoly rents.”86 The success of the advertising, and in
turn the rent-seeking, largely depends on the level of sophistication of the
consumer: “[I]t is harder to fool [consumers when] higher stakes justify a
greater willingness to obtain alternative sources of information or to obtain the
sophistication necessary to critically examine any distorted information
provided.”87
C. The Judiciary
The adjudicative process exhibits certain structural elements that determine
its efficacy. Courts have defined rules and requirements that determine
participation, such as the requirements of standing and an actual case or

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See Freiwald, supra note 16, at 601.
KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 105–06.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 107.
Id. at 100, 112.
Id. at 101.
See id. at 116.
Id.
KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 117.
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controversy.88 The court system is also significantly smaller in scope, tending
only to solve a problem based on particular facts, and does not necessarily
provide for the desired social benefit, as the ability of courts to fashion broad
and long reaching relief is limited.89
Komesar also highlights the contention that judges and juries may not be
good decision-makers. Specifically, judges may have trouble comprehending
the factual situations in highly complex and technical litigation.90 Contributing
to this potential ignorance is that judges are often insulated from information
concerning the benefits and detriments to the public, starkly contrasted with
legislators.91 Instead, judges “depend on others to convince them by evidence
and reason, but they do not depend on these others for their jobs and
livelihood.”92 However, this independence provides an essential advantage, as
biases in other institutions are often avoided or reduced in the adjudicative
process because of the many rules and standards employed by the judiciary.93
While all three of these institutions are available to groups in pursuing
their desired policy goal, some inevitably pose higher participation costs than
others. Further, the actions emanating from these institutions result in varying
levels of benefits for the “victorious” conglomeration of interests. The
resulting actions from one institution may even have effects on the solutions of
other institutions. “[N]ot only may Congress be ill-suited to make a change,
but, once it does, that decision may compromise the ability of other institutions
to solve the problem.”94 This volleying of problems from one institution to the
next is illustrated in the evolution of the legal conundrum of peer-to-peer (P2P)
networks and secondary liability, and the inability of the current law to provide
an acceptable remedy.
III. GROKSTER V. THE INDUCE ACT
The Supreme Court, in Grokster, reviewed the opinion of the Ninth
Circuit, which held the P2P software provider Grokster free from liability even
though it found that some P2P software “may have intentionally structured
their businesses to avoid secondary liability for copyright infringement, while
benefiting financially from the illicit draw of their wares.”95 The Induce Act
88. Id. at 123–26.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 138–39.
91. Id. at 141.
92. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 141.
93. Id.
94. Freiwald, supra note 16, at 582.
95. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D.
Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). Even though
not part of the Ninth Circuit opinion, this quote from the District Court is instructive in
illustrating the reasoning of the circuit court.
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was introduced to amend section 501 of the Copyright Act to create a “new
form” of secondary liability for intentionally inducing copyright infringement
and to overrule the District Court’s decision and the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent
affirmation.96
The debate over the Induce Act, like most legislative battles, brought
together a collection of groups that opposed the legislation as well as a
collection of groups that endorsed the legislation. For purposes of simplicity,
these varying interests will be cataloged and discussed in this Note through the
following labels: software distributors, who are fighting to ensure that
secondary liability is not expanded to the extent that it would chill innovation
of technology that has a legitimate and legal purpose but could be used for
copyright infringement; Internet users, who are fighting for P2P technology
that facilitates the downloading of copyrighted music and movies at lower than
market prices; and copyright owners, who include the individual artists as well
as the overarching labels,97 trade groups, and other industries aimed at stopping
the worldwide infringement on copyrights. The Internet users and software
distributors have teamed up, for different reasons, to defeat the Induce Act, and
to leave the copyright owners searching for an alternate solution.
Part A of this section will discuss the evolution of copyright infringement,
which was, until the recent barrage of attempted legislative efforts, generally
judicially crafted. Part B of this section will examine the Induce Act, written
largely by legislators and numerous interested groups that have become
involved in this process. Parts C and D will discuss other institutional
solutions to the development of online piracy, namely market and judicial
solutions, respectively.
A.

Historical Analysis of Copyright Infringement

Presently, the traditional cause of action for copyright owners against a
secondary copyright infringer exists in common law, as the Copyright Act of
1976 did not specifically codify any sort of secondary liability for copyright
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
infringement.98
Management, Inc., the court held that when a concert manager knew that the
musicians were to include performances of copyrighted compositions, the
manager was both a contributory and vicarious infringer of the copyrights.99
The court explained that “one who, with [1] knowledge of the infringing
activity, [2] induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct

96. Michael Warnecke, Critics Fear ‘Induce Act’ Will Undo Sony; Could Perfect 10-Visa Be
Wave of Future?, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., July 16, 2004, at 318, 318.
97. The labels usually own the copyright to reproduce the actual music.
98. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161–62 (2d
Cir. 1971).
99. 443 F.2d at 1162–63.
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of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”100 The court also
elaborated on the doctrine of vicarious liability: “[A] person who has promoted
or induced the infringing acts of the performer has been held jointly and
severally liable as a ‘vicarious’ infringer, even though he has no actual
knowledge that copyright monopoly is being impaired.”101 Noting that
vicarious liability has its roots in the employment field, the court held that the
liability should also exist in this situation, when the concert manager “[1] has
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and [2] also has a direct
financial interest in such activities.”102
The present clash between copyright owners and P2P software producers is
not the first time that technology producers defended a product from a
secondary liability claim. In 1984 the Supreme Court decided Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., where owners of copyrighted
television programs brought an infringement action against the manufacturers
of videotape recorders.103 The Court noted that while the Copyright Act grants
certain exclusive rights to the holder, “[a]ll reproductions of the work,
however, are not within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner . . . [a]ny
individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a ‘fair use’; the copyright
owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use.”104
Because of Congress’s constitutional grant of power to regulate copyrights,
the Court looked to contributory infringement under patent statutes so as not to
expand the protections of copyrights without legislative guidance.105 “These
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution of unpatented
articles unless they are ‘unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use.’
Unless a commodity ‘has no use except through practice of the patented
method,’ the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution constitutes
contributory infringement.”106 The Court held that because the VCR merely
“time-shifted” television programs, which was actually encouraged by the
copyright holders, it was capable of a substantial non-infringing use, and Sony
could not be held liable when consumers used the VCR to make illegal copies
of other copyrighted videos.107 The Court’s holding in Sony and its subsequent
application varied among the circuits; while trying to hold true to the logic set
forth in Sony, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits developed different methods to

100. Id. at 1162.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 464 U.S. 417, 419–20 (1984).
104. Id. at 433.
105. See id. at 439.
106. Id. at 441. (citing Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198, 199
(1980)).
107. Id. at 446, 456.
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deal with contributory liability and the Sony defense of a “substantial
noninfringing use.”
The Ninth Circuit was first presented with the opportunity to weigh in on
the application of Sony to P2P networks in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc.108 Napster, which facilitated the exchange of digital audio files over the
internet (through these P2P networks), was alleged to vicariously and
contributorily infringe on certain copyrights held by record companies.109 To
use Napster, an individual would simply download the necessary software,
which allowed the search for and transfer of exact copies of the digital audio
files.110 The software enabled a user to “share” audio files on a computer by
uploading the Napster-verified files to a Napster-controlled central database.111
In finding Napster liable, the Ninth Circuit adopted the definition of
contributory infringement from Gershwin: “one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another.”112 Finding that Napster had both actual and constructive
knowledge of direct infringement, the court held that the first prong of the test
for contributory infringement was met.113 Applying Sony, the court enunciated
“a limited interpretation of the Sony rule, declining to interpret the ‘substantial
noninfringing use’ test as an absolute shield against secondary liability.”114
According to the court, the substantial noninfringing use is not restrained to
current uses of the service, but instead should focus “on the proportion of
current infringing use as compared to current and future noninfringing use.”115
Thus, the Ninth Circuit developed a two-part knowledge test: if a defendant’s
product is found to have substantial noninfringing uses, they will not be
charged with constructive knowledge of infringement, but actual knowledge of
infringement automatically satisfies this element despite substantial
noninfringing uses.116
As to the material contribution element, the district court concluded that
“[w]ithout the support services defendant provides, Napster users could not
find and download the music they want with the ease of which defendant
108. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
109. Id. at 1010–11.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1012.
112. Id. at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
113. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. The first element in a contributory copyright infringement
case is actually direct infringement by a primary infringer, but this element is almost always
undisputed in these cases, and is nevertheless not relevant to this Note’s discussion. See MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004).
114. Elizabeth Miles, Note, In Re Aimster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and
the Sony Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 27–28 (2004).
115. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
116. Miles, supra note 114, at 28.
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boasts.”117 Thus, satisfying both of the elements of contributory infringement,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s opinion, holding that Napster had
committed contributory infringement of the plaintiff’s copyrights.118
The court then moved to the vicarious liability of Napster, asking if the
defendant “ha[d] the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and
also ha[d] a direct financial interest in such activities.”119 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court’s ruling that Napster had a direct financial interest in
the infringing activity, noting that the “[f]inancial benefit exists where the
availability of infringing material ‘acts as a “draw” for customers.’”120 The
district court had relied on the finding that Napster’s future revenue is directly
connected to the increase in registered users, and registered users increase as
the “quality and quantity of available music increases.”121
Even though the Ninth Circuit found that Napster’s “right and ability to
supervise” is limited to the system’s architecture of uploaded files, the court
nevertheless held that Napster “ha[d] the ability to locate infringing material
listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access to the
system,” and therefore held that the duty element of vicarious liability was
satisfied as well.122
However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was not the last word on the
application of copyright law to the unique situations of copyright infringement
facilitated by the use of P2P networks. In the case In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, the Seventh Circuit upheld an injunction, finding that Aimster was
likely to be a contributory infringer.123 The use of the Aimster service, like the
Napster service, required certain downloadable software, which allowed
registered users to send messages back and forth with audio files attached.124
The court found that the Aimster system had the following elements:
[P]roprietary software that can be downloaded free of charge from Aimster’s
Web site; Aimster’s server . . . which hosts the Web site and collects and
organizes information obtained from the users but does not make copies of the
swapped files themselves and that also provides the matching service described
below; computerized tutorials instructing users of the software on how to use it

117. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
118. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
119. Id. (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
120. Id. at 1023 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263–64 (9th Cir.
1996)).
121. A&M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
122. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
123. 334 F.3d 643, 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2003).
124. Id. at 646.
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for swapping computer files; and “Club Aimster,” a related Internet service . . .
that users . . . can join for a fee.125

In discussing the “substantial non-infringing use” test, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that “the ability of a service provider to prevent its customers from
infringing is a factor to be considered in determining whether the provider is a
contributory infringer.”126 However, the court held that this factor is not
controlling, as the court noted that if the “detection and prevention of the
infringing uses would be highly burdensome,”127 then a balancing test is
required, “[b]ut the balancing of costs and benefits is necessary only in a case
in which substantial noninfringing uses, present or prospective, are
demonstrated.”128 Unfortunately for Aimster, this test was never applied, as
Aimster produced no evidence that the service had been used for a
noninfringing use.129
The Seventh Circuit also disagreed with the discussion of the knowledge
prong of contributory infringement in Napster, stating that “the Ninth Circuit
erred . . . in suggesting that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a
sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer.”130
Nevertheless, the court still found that Aimster was willfully blind, satisfying
the knowledge element, and was therefore a contributory infringer.131
The Ninth Circuit had a chance to refine its application of Sony and
secondary liability in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.132
The court began its analysis by distinguishing the different “architectures” of
P2P systems.133 The first was a centralized indexing system that maintained a
listing of the available files on a company-owned server, which Napster
used.134 The second was a decentralized indexing system, where the company
only maintained a list of available files on the network.135 The third was a
“supernode” system, where there were no lists and each connected computer
listed its available files.136
The court continued by highlighting the substantial non-infringing use test
that it elicited in Napster:

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. at 648.
Id.
334 F.3d at 650; see also Miles, supra note 114, at 36.
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 650.
380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1158–59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Thus, in order to analyze the required element of knowledge of infringement,
we must first determine what level of knowledge to require. If the product at
issue is not capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing
uses, then the copyright owner need only show that the defendant had
constructive knowledge of the infringement. On the other hand, if the product
at issue is capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing
uses, then the copyright owner must demonstrate that the defendant had
reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files and failed to act on that
knowledge to prevent infringement.137

The court, finding that the software had substantial non-infringing uses,
continued the analysis by determining if Grokster had reasonable knowledge of
specific infringement.138 The court held that the decentralized structure of the
network, which enabled the P2P sharing, did not provide Grokster actual,
specific knowledge of infringement.139
Moving to the material contribution prong of contributory infringement,
the court noted that Grokster did not provide the site and facilities used for
infringement.140 The court elaborated by stating that “it is the users of the
software who, by connecting to each other over the internet, create the network
and provide the access. ‘Failure’ to alter software located on another’s
computer is simply not akin to the failure to delete a filename from one’s own
computer.”141 Therefore, the plaintiff had proved neither prong, and the court
dismissed the claim that Grokster was liable for contributory copyright
liability.142
In analyzing Grokster’s vicarious liability and, more specifically,
Grokster’s right and ability to supervise, the court noted that “[i]t does not
appear from any of the evidence that either of the defendants has the ability to
block access to individual users. . . . [They had] no ability to actually terminate
access to file sharing functions.”143 The plaintiffs, arguing the willful
blindness theory used by the Seventh Circuit, met opposition by the court:
If the Software Distributors had a right and ability to control and supervise that
they proactively refused to exercise, such refusal would not absolve them of
liability. . . . However . . . there is no separate “blind eye” theory . . . that exists
independently of the traditional elements of liability.144

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161.
Id. at 1161–62.
Id. at 1163.
Id.
Id.
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1166.
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Therefore, the court found that since there is no ability for Grokster to control
the direct infringement, it was not vicariously liable.145
At the end of the decision, the court discussed the Supreme Court’s
reluctance in Sony to change the applicable laws when presented with a
difficult case, stating “the Supreme Court has admonished us to leave such
matters to Congress . . . the district court . . . properly declined the invitation to
alter [applicable copyright law].”146 Congress heard the call of the court and
introduced the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act in an attempt to
correct what was seen as an inconsistency in the application of secondary
copyright infringement.147
B.

Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act

Aiming to answer the courts’ call for legislative guidance, Sen. Hatch and
the Act’s co-sponsors originally introduced the Induce Act on June 22, 2004.148
There have been two substantive drafts that will be discussed to illustrate the
divide between the two sides of the debate and their respective interests.
1.

Analysis of Original Draft of the Induce Act

Hatch, in his introduction of the bill, described the current state of affairs:
“[I]t is illegal and immoral to induce or encourage children to commit crimes.
Artists realize that adults who corrupt or exploit the innocence of children are
the worst type of villains.”149 Sen. Leahy, who co-sponsored the Induce Act,
insisted it would only target P2P software providers:
[T]he bill will continue to promote the development of new technologies as it
will not impose liability on the manufacturers of copying technology merely
because the possibility exists for abuse . . . the makers of electronic
equipment . . . the Internet service providers . . . have nothing to fear from this
bill.150

The Induce Act, which would have amended section 501 of Title 17 of the
U.S. Code, contained three subsections: the first subsection defined
“intentionally induces”; the second subsection added the new classification of

145. Id.
146. Id. at 1167.
147. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
148. 150 CONG. REC. S7189 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
149. Id. The discussion of the Induce Act’s language and subsequent congressional hearings
is done for the purpose of setting up the debate between the two disparate interests, as this Note is
more concerned about what the groups believed that would lead them to fight for or against the
Induce Act with such fervor. An in-depth analysis of the claims of the supporters and opponents
of the bill is beyond the scope of this Note.
150. 150 CONG. REC. S7193 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). But see
infra Part III.B.1.a–d (discussing criticisms of the Induce Act).
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liability: intentional inducement; and the third subsection was a savings clause
for the already established doctrines of secondary liability.151
According to the bill, “intentionally induces” was defined as “intentionally
aids, abets, induces, or procures, and intent may be shown by acts from which
a reasonable person would find intent to induce infringement based upon all
relevant information about such acts then reasonably available to the actor,
including whether the activity relies on infringement for its commercial
viability.”152 “Intentionally aids, abets, induces, or procures” was borrowed
from the criminal code concerning copyright infringement.153 The second
substantial part of this subsection introduced a reasonable person standard (a
question of fact for a jury) into the equation of intentional inducement.154
Finally, the bill described an infringing activity as one that “relies on
infringement for its commercial viability,” intending to formulate the law in
such a way as to treat services like Napster and Grokster equally.155
The second subsection statutorily defined the intentional inducement form
of liability,156 stating that “whoever intentionally induces any violation
identified in subsection (a) shall be liable as an infringer.”157 The final section
of the legislation notes that “[n]othing in this subsection shall enlarge or
diminish the doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability for copyright
infringement or require any court to unjustly withhold or impose any
secondary liability for copyright infringement.”158 Sen. Hatch described this
section as a “savings clause to ensure that it provides the ‘guidance’ courts
have requested—not an iron-clad rule of decision for all possible future
cases.”159
Needless to say, this initial draft met a good deal of opposition from
software distributors and Internet users, mostly through congressional
testimony, the media, and the use of Internet sites, and generally focused on
how the bill could chill innovation.160

151. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
152. Id. at § 2.
153. Id.; 150 CONG. REC. S7189 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
154. See id.
155. See id.; 150 CONG. REC. S7190–92 (daily ed. June 22, 2004).
156. See Explanatory Memorandum from Copyright Office, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/
S2560.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
157. S. 2560 at § 2.
158. Id.
159. 105 CONG. REC. S7192 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
160. A good example of “chilling innovation” is the recent release of a movie jukebox whose
manufacturers aimed to please Hollywood by going to great lengths to ensure that the content on
the device could not be shared. Cory Doctorow, Go Ask Hollywood, POPULAR SCI., Jan. 2005, at
40. Nevertheless, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) is still contemplating
litigation. Id.
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The Induce Act Does Not Adequately Change Existing Law

The confusion concerning the application of law to P2P networks that,
while operating differently, still enabled illegal infringement, exhibited the
necessity for the Induce Act. However, varying interpretations could render
the bill useless,161 as some believe that the Induce Act would not change the
Ninth Circuit’s result in Grokster.162 “The entertainment industry contends
that Grokster . . . induce[d] infringement. . . [h]owever the Grokster court
found no evidence of such seduction. . . . [T]he suit would probably fail at trial
unless the industry could produce more solid evidence of intent to induce
infringement.”163
Instead of changing existing law, it appeared that the bill merely adopted
existing case law.164 Commentators believed that uncertainty brought about by
vague language in the initial draft of the bill would accomplish little but to
Because the definition “is not simple, clear or
chill innovation.165
predictable. . . . [A] too-broad definition of inducement may impose a
dangerous burden to development of and investment in useful and beneficial
technologies to the detriment of U.S. competitiveness.”166
b.

Following Patent Law Standards of “Intentional Inducement” Would
Bring About More Certainty

The Supreme Court relied on patent law when constructing the substantial
non-infringing use test of Sony, and many commentators believe that Congress
should continue to refer to patent law when attempting to correct the problems
with the current law as applied to P2P networks.167 Andrew Greenberg of the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, in his congressional testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated:
For example, the standard of “intentional inducement” does not appear to
require actions independent of lawful marketing of features of a technology
capable of both infringing and noninfringing uses; does not appear to require
knowledge that the acts were induced to find an infringement; and does not
appear to require a subjective specific intent to induce the infringing acts.168

161. The Intentional Inducement of Copyrights Act of 2004: Hearing on S. 2560 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2560] (statement of
Andrew Greenberg, Vice-Chairman, Intellectual Property Committee of the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers-United States of America).
162. Id. (statement of Kevin McGuiness, Executive Director and General Counsel, Net
Coalition).
163. Id.
164. Id. (statement of Andrew Greenberg).
165. Id.
166. Hearings on S. 2560, supra note 161.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Adopting patent law standards that have been interpreted by the courts adds a
certain amount of predictability that is important to technology developers
when designing a new product, which critics say has been ignored by the
Induce Act.169
c.

The Induce Act Could Create an Inordinate Amount of Litigation

Since this bill adopted a reasonable person standard, courts may be
reluctant to dismiss a case in order to allow a plaintiff an opportunity for
discovery.170 “Although intentional inducement standard in the bill might
sound like a difficult standard to meet, it does not require proof that the
defendant actually intended to induce infringement. Rather, the defendant[‘]s
intent can be inferred, culled from literally any document within the
defendant[‘]s possession.”171
Not only will it be more difficult to convince a court to dismiss a claim
under this bill, the Induce Act could also open up many other parties to
potential liability.172 “Under this bill, anyone who can be considered to be
aiding, abetting, procuring, or inducing someone to engage in copyright
infringement is subject to liability. . . . [V]enture capitalists [and] credit card
companies . . . could find themselves the target of litigation.”173
d.

The Induce Act Attempts to Overturn Sony

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
Studios, Inc. is the “tech industry’s Magna Carta. . . . It gives security to
venture capitalists that they can invest in new technologies without being sued.
It is responsible for the burst of tech innovation we’ve seen in the past 20
years. This bill would change all that.”174 Some from the software distributor
camp believed that Sony would not have been liable for contributory
infringement, but could have been found to have induced infringement.175
Proponents of the bill disagree with this analysis. The copyright holders
insist that since the “inducement” language is taken from the Patent Act, courts
would look to rulings under the Patent Act.176 “Knowing that some customers
are going to infringe isn’t enough to establish inducement . . . [a] seller must

169. Id.
170. Hearings on S. 2560, supra note 161 (statement of Kevin McGuiness).
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Steve Seidenberg, Senate Bill Puts Power in Hands of Copyright Owners, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 2004, at 16 (quoting Michael Petricone, vice president of technology policy for the
Consumer Electronics Association).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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communicate in some way that you can use the machine for an infringing
purpose.”177
2.

Copyright Office Draft

After the initial congressional hearing, extensive media coverage and
increased lobbying influenced the Copyright Office to issue a revised draft
aimed to appease both sides of the debate.178 The Copyright Office operated
under the main assumption, which it perceived as legislative intent, that the bill
should be technology-neutral and impose liability based on the circumstances
in which the technology is used.179 The language employed should also
provide an effective cause of action against those services that have escaped
liability through the court’s interpretation of the current law.180 As previously
mentioned, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Grokster, and the resulting
discontent of the copyright holder lobby, was one of the main motivations for
this bill.181 To satisfy the innovators, the Copyright Office draft was structured
to only target technology that does intentionally induces others to infringe
copyrights; recognizing that some technology has dual uses, these innovators
should not be liable if the public uses their technology for illegal purposes.182
If the first draft of the legislation was vague, which many opponents of the bill
argued, the Copyright Office draft detailed more of the specifics of what it
perceived to be the Senate’s intent.183
The Copyright Office draft has four main subsections. The first section
highlighted three elements, one of which must be met to impose liability:
Whoever manufactures, offers to the public, provides, or otherwise traffics in
any product or service, such as a computer program, technology, device or
component, that is a cause of individuals engaging in public dissemination of
copyrighted works shall be liable as an infringer where such activity: (A) relies
on infringing public dissemination for its commercial viability; (B) derives a
predominant portion of its revenues from infringing public dissemination; or
(C) principally relies on infringing public dissemination to attract individuals
to the product or service.184

In drafting the language of the bill, the Copyright Office, consistent with
what it perceived as legislative intent, claimed to focus on the business model

177.
178.
19.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. (quoting patent and copyright lawyer Ronald Clayton).
See Gigi B. Sohn, Radical Act Would Induce Big Chill, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at
See id.
See id.
See id.
See generally id.
See Sohn, supra note 178.
Explanatory Memorandum from Copyright Office, supra note 156.
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surrounding the technology, rather than the behavior or technology itself.185
This illustrates the reasoning behind the language of the first section, which
specifically defined the infringing activities. “Under this approach, there is no
need for the courts to get into thorny questions about how a particular
technology was designed, what its particular functions can or can’t do, or
difficult questions of intent.”186 The Copyright Office attempted to classify a
product or service as an inducer of infringement of copyrights according to the
percentage of revenue that the particular product or service derives from the
dissemination of copyrighted material.187
Another doctrinally relevant phrase refers to products that are “a cause of
individuals engaging in infringing public dissemination of copyrighted
works.”188 One of the principal arguments of the innovators concerning the
first draft of the bill was that it was too vague, and that no one could predict
how the courts would interpret a term like “induce,” which, if misinterpreted,
could chill innovation.189 The Copyright Office discarded the possibility of
using the term “cause,” stating that “[p]redicating liability on whether the
defendant ‘causes’ infringement could be interpreted as requiring that the
defendant’s conduct be the proximate or ultimate cause of the infringement,
which we rejected as too high a burden.”190
The second subsection defined the term “public dissemination” as “digital
transmission to the public of copies or phonorecords or any other exercise of
any of the rights set forth in sections 106(3), 106(4), 106(5) or 106(6).”191
Importantly, to allay the concern of the software distributors, “the mere
infringement of the reproduction right or the derivative work right, without any
of these additional elements, would not constitute ‘public dissemination’ [and
could not] be used to target manufacturers and marketers of devices used for
copying.”192
Other concessions were made to the technology innovators in the third
section of the Copyright Office draft, which discussed two possible remedies
for those found to induce the infringement of copyrights: statutory damages
and injunctions.193 Statutory damages are only available if the violation is
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Hearings on S. 2560, supra note 161 (statement of Andrew Greenberg).
190. Explanatory Memorandum from Copyright Office, supra note 156.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. The section states specifically:
(A) No award of statutory damages under Section 504(c) shall be made for a violation of
this subsection unless the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court
finds, that such violation was committed willfully. (B) In granting injunctive relief under
Section 502 for a violation of this subsection, the court shall, to the extent practicable,
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found to be willful; however, even nonwillful violators would be liable for
actual damages and lost profits.194 Further, the draft also addressed the
concerns that the Induce Act would increase the amount of litigation to which
software distributors would be subjected by making unsuccessful plaintiffs
liable for the defendant’s attorney fees.195 An injunction, the second remedy,
“must, where practicable fashion the scope of the injunction not to restrain or
prevent the noninfringing uses of the product or service at issue. . . . [That is] a
critical aspect of the Sony decision. . . .”196
The final subsection of the Copyright Office draft attempted to preserve
the settled law of the doctrine of secondary liability, as well as the established
defenses.197 Again, trying to appease the innovators, this subsection attempted
to save the Sony doctrine that appeared to be the deal-breaker for the
innovators.198
Nevertheless, this draft suffered the same fate as the original draft, as both
sides were still wary of the unclear language. Sen. Hatch, after realizing that
the parties could not reach a compromise, asked the interested parties to
propose acceptable language, and then left it to them to work out the details.199
As imagined, the parties were unable to reach a compromise.200 “[T]he talks
appeared to have collapsed because neither side could agree on how to achieve
a balance between protecting technology companies from litigation for their
products while, at the same time, outlawing file-sharing companies that profit
from the illegal distribution of copyrighted works.”201
3.

Earlier Attempted Solutions to the P2P problem

When Napster, the first notable P2P service, was publicly introduced in
September 1999, it became immediately popular, with the number of users
doubling every five or six weeks.202 In February 2001, Napster had 80 million
users trading songs online.203 This massive distribution of copyrighted
limit the scope of the injunctive relief so as not to prevent or restrain noninfringing uses of
the product or service.
Id.
194. Id.
195. Explanatory Memorandum from Copyright Office, supra note 156.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Sarah Lai Stirland, Talks Collapse in Effort to Reach Deal on File-Sharing Bill,
CONGRESSDAILYAM, Oct. 7, 2004.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Matthew Green, Note, Napster Opens Pandora’s Box: Examining How File-Sharing
Services Threaten the Enforcement of Copyright on the Internet, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 801
(2002).
203. Id. at 802.
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material was undoubtedly a major concern of the music industry, but the bigger
concern was how to stop the illegal downloading. Several artists spoke out
against Napster, including Don Henley, Garth Brooks, Art Alexakis of
Everclear, Elton John, and Puff Daddy.204 In December 1999, the Recording
Industry Association of American (RIAA) brought litigation against
Napster.205 In March 2000, Metallica and Dr. Dre soon followed with their
own suits against Napster.206 However, the music industry could not ensure a
solution by itself. Acting on behalf of the music interests, the RIAA was
joined by other stakeholders, including the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA), the Music Producers Guild (MPG), the Business Software
Alliance (BSA), and other parties who had an interest in keeping property
rights from being infringed upon by internet users.207
Nevertheless, the Induce Act was not the first piece of legislation aimed at
curbing the illegal downloading of copyrighted material over P2P networks. In
1998, in response to the fears of Internet service providers (ISPs) concerning
their liability for the direct copyright infringement of their users, Congress
enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).208 In this legislation,
Congress identified “safe harbors” for these ISPs, but only “to the extent that
the infringement involves four functions: transitory network transmissions,
caching, storage of materials on behalf of users (e.g., web hosting, remote file
storage), and the provision of information location tools (e.g., providing links,
directories, search engines).”209
Generally, the DMCA strengthened copyright protection by prohibiting the
“circumvention of copy-protection technologies” and the distribution of
information detailing how to overcome those technologies.210 Some believed
that the safe harbors constructed within the DMCA could be undermined by
the Induce Act.211 “While these limits would continue to apply with respect to
the services offered by ISPs . . . under [the Induce Act], an ISP could be sued
for inducing infringement by distributing software that enables infringement,
such as software enabling broadband services.”212 Nevertheless, most of the
law revolving around secondary liability of copyright infringement is case

204. Id. at 803.
205. Reuters, Metallica Raps Napster, Mar. 29, 2001, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/
03/29/archive/technology/main282384.shtml.
206. Id.
207. Green, supra note 202, at 804.
208. Elliot M. Zimmerman, P2P File Sharing: Direct and Indirect Copyright Infringement,
FLA. B. J., May 2004, at 40, 41; see Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998).
209. Zimmerman, supra note 208, at 41.
210. Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 911 (2004).
211. Hearings on S. 2560, supra note 161 (statement of Kevin McGuiness).
212. Id.
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developed, and few pieces of legislation have attempted to modify it until the
proposal of the Induce Act.213
Other proposed legislation attempted to solve the problem of illegal filesharing over P2P networks. In 2002, Rep. Howard Berman introduced the
“P2P Piracy Prevention Bill,”214 which was “essentially a self-help provision
that would have allowed a copyright owner to use technology to deter or
prevent the unauthorized use of her works over the internet, so long as the
owner did not significantly impair the unauthorized user’s computer.”215
Predictably, the bill was received well by copyright owners but vigorously
opposed by the innovators and Internet users, as it gave copyright owners
unprecedented self-help power, while offering very little protection for
individual Internet users.216
The Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act,217 introduced in January 2003,
would have mandated that CDs with copy protection be properly identified, as
well as making sales of mislabeled, copy-protected CDs illegal.218 “The
proposal serves the public access interests in the constitutional grant by
enabling consumers to exercise their property interests as well as to create

213. 150 CONG. REC. S7189 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
214. H.R. 5211 pmbl., 107th Cong. (2002). The bill specifically stated:
A copyright owner shall not be liable in any criminal or civil action for disabling,
interfering with, blocking, diverting, or otherwise impairing the unauthorized distribution,
display, performance, or reproduction of his or her copyrighted work on a publicly
accessible peer-to-peer file trading network, if such impairment does not, without
authorization, alter, delete, or otherwise impair the integrity of any computer file or data
residing on the computer of a file trader.
Id. at § 1(a)(a).
215. Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer?, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 371, 398 (Summer 2003).
216. Id. at 400.
217. H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003).
218. The Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act details:
[A] prerecorded digital music disc product shall be considered mislabeled if it 1) bears
any logo or marking, which, in accordance with common practice, identifies it as an audio
compact disc; 2) fails to bear a label on the package in which it is sold at retail in words
that are prominent and plainly legible on the front of the package that—A) it is not an
audio disc; B) it might not play properly in all devices capable of playing audio compact
discs; and C) it might not be recordable on a personal computer or other device capable of
recording content from an audio compact disc; or 3) fails to provide the following
information on the packaging which it sold at retail in words that are prominent and
plainly legible— A) any minimum recommended software requirements for playback or
recordabilty on a personal computer; B) any restrictions on the number of times song files
may be downloaded to the hard drive of a personal computer; and C) the applicable return
policy for consumers who find that the prerecorded digital music disc product does not
play properly in a device capable of playing an audio compact disc.
Id. at § 24A(c).
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technologies that serve non-infringing purposes.”219 Both of these bills were
referred and eventually stalled out in the House Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property.220
C. Market Solutions
Even though prior legislation had not been incredibly successful in
stemming illegal file-sharing, the RIAA and other copyright owners had
employed other means to protect against copyright infringers. Possible
market-related solutions included the education of the file-sharing public, the
increased use of copy-protection techniques, and the alteration of the business
model to attract those users who want to possess cheap digital files.
The RIAA’s purpose in launching an education campaign was to educate
consumers on the negative impact of pirating music.221 The RIAA’s Web site
displayed anti-piracy quotes from a wide variety of artists, while some artists
even took education into their own hands.222 “[T]he Dixie Chicks and Missy
Elliot have appeared on MTV and BET to relay artists’ concern. Even
Madonna chastised her fans for downloading an illegal copy of her new single,
American Life.”223 At the 2004 GRAMMY Awards, the Recording Academy
unveiled a major education campaign, which included a new Web site entitled
“whatsthedownload.com,” various print and radio advertisements, grassroots
activities, and retail appearances.224 Music United for Strong Internet
Copyright, another group advocating the protection of intellectual property
rights, purchased educational advertisements in newspapers and secured a
series of radio and television commercials featuring artists discussing the
negative impacts of illegal file-sharing.225
The mass number of lawsuits filed by the RIAA against individual filesharers also served to further educate the public, although inadvertently.226 If
the passive file-sharer was previously unaware of the intricacies of copyright
law, and thought Napster was merely an affordable way to build a music
collection, surely the thousands of lawsuits filed enlightened even the least

219. Rebekah O’Hara, You Say You Want a Revolution: Music & Technology—Evolution or
Destruction?, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 247, 288 (2004).
220. Id. at 285.
221. Norman, supra note 215, at 403.
222. Id.
223. Yu, supra note 210, at 921.
224. Id.
225. Norman, supra note 215, at 403.
226. Yu, supra note 210, at 922. The MPAA is also attempting to educate consumers on the
negative effects of downloading movies, by pointing out that downloaded movies are of a poor
quality, the effect movie piracy will have on non-movie star employees, and the risk of criminal
prosecution. Anna E. Engelman & Dale A. Scott, Arrgh! Hollywood Targets Internet Piracy, 11
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 62 (2004).
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legal-savvy Internet user. According to a July 2004 survey, it appeared that the
education efforts had been successful: “64 percent of those surveyed believed
it is illegal to make music from the computer available for others to download
for free.”227 In fact, the Internet traffic related to P2P applications decreased
by almost 50% on university networks.228
The recording industry also explored increased copy-protection on the
media itself. After observing the positive effects copy-protection technology
had on the pirating of DVDs, the recording industry began to experiment with
its own version of copy-protection technology.229 These methods, however,
are quite controversial as they would not allow consumers to make copies of
purchased media, even for personal use.230 Another possible copy protection
method is encryption, where only a person who has a “key” can gain access to
the media file.231 Still another method would allow the files to be identified
through the use of a digital watermark or fingerprint, which would allow the
copyrighted material to be controlled and located and could prevent infringing
files from being swapped over P2P networks.232
Commentators have also proposed an alteration of the business models of
copyright owners, which have included special materials or features in a retailbought CD, thus making pirated products less valuable, or possibly the creation
of commercial P2P networks, which in fact is currently being utilized.233
There have been a number of successful business models based on the sale of

227. Grant Gross, RIAA Files 896 New File-Trading Lawsuits, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Aug.
25, 2004, http://www.thestandard.com/article.php/20040825203958223.
228. John Borland, College P2P Use on the Decline?, CNET NEWS.COM,
http://news.com.com/College+P2P+use+on+the+decline/2100-1027_3-5322329.html (Aug. 24,
2004).
But see Jefferson Graham, Online File Swapping Endures, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-07-11-fileswap_x.htm (July 11, 2004) (stating that in
June 2004, 8.3 million people were using P2P programs, an increase of 19% from a year earlier,
discounting current surveys stating that people were using P2P services less); Brian Hindo, Did
Big Music Really Sink the Pirates?, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, http://www.businessweek.com/
print/technology/content/jan2004/tc20040116_9177_tc024.htm ?chan=tc& (Jan. 16, 2004) (citing
that these polls are inaccurate because of a skewed sample, by only phoning U.S. adults and
restricting questions to only a small number of P2P services, excluding newer P2P services, like
Bit Torrent and eDonkey).
229. Matthew C. Mousley, Note, Peer-to-Peer Combat: The Entertainment Industry’s
Arsenal in Its War on Digital Piracy, 48 VILL. L. REV. 667, 689–90 (2003).
230. Norman, supra note 215, at 406. However, iTunes has had much recent success, even
though the ability to manipulate the files is limited. iTunes Music Store Sells over One Million
Songs in First Week, www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/may/05musicstore.html (May 5, 2003).
231. Kristine Pesta, Comment, The Piracy Prevention Bill, H.R. 5211: The Second
Generation’s Answer to Copyright Infringement over Peer-to-Peer Networks, 33 SW. U. L. Rev.
397, 406 (2004).
232. Id. at 406–07.
233. Doris Estelle Long, E-Business Solutions to P2P Piracy: A Practical Guide, 779 PRAC.
L. INST. 727, 761 (2004).
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MP3s on the Internet.234 “[A] full 3 percent of Internet users and 17 percent of
music downloaders now currently use paid music services. Some 7 percent of
the user population admits to buying music from these services at one point or
another.”235
D. Judicial Solutions
The copyright holders were successful in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., where the court enjoined Napster from “engaging in, or facilitating others
in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’
copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either
federal or state law, without express permission of the rights owner.”236
However, the damage was already done, as new P2P software was already
developed, designed to circumvent the judicially constructed law in Napster.
New networks appeared that conformed to Napster and attempted to resist
litigation by shifting the liability from the network owners to the individual
infringers.237 To add further urgency to the problem, the RIAA reported that
the industry lost $4.2 billion in 2001, and the BSA estimated a loss to the
industry of $10.97 billion in 2001.238
Frustrated by the inability of the judicial system to limit the P2P software,
the RIAA decided to start suing individual users. In April 2003, RIAA filed
suit against four university students, who quickly settled, and followed that
success with suits against 261 more individuals in September of 2003.239
234. For a thorough discussion of the intricacies of alternative business models, see DEREK
SLATER ET AL., HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, CONTENT AND CONTROL: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF
POLICY CHOICES ON POTENTIAL ONLINE BUSINESS MODELS IN THE MUSIC AND FILM
INDUSTRIES, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu /media/files/content_control.pdf.
235. Michael A. Einhorn, Music in the Crucible: A Year in Review, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW
1, 24 (2004) (detailing an exhaustive discussion of the many different types of music services
currently being offered).
236. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
237. See discussion of Aimster and Grokster, supra Part III.
238. Mousley, supra note 229, at 669–71; see also SLATER ET AL., supra note 234, at 6
(“[O]nline infringements reasonably can be expected to reduce revenues in the long run.”). But
see Hindo, supra note 228 (“[I]n 2003 CD album sales slipped 2%––a less dramatic drop than the
9% slide the previous year. Also, fourth-quarter 2003 sales picked up 5.6% over 2002.”);
KOLEMAN STRUMPF & FELIX OLBERHOZER, THE EFFECT OF FILE-SHARING ON RECORD SALES:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Mar. 2004), http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March
2004.pdf.
While 65% of users say downloading led them to not purchase an album, 80% claim they
bought at least one album after first sampling it on a file sharing network. . . . While
downloads occur on a vast scale, most users are likely individuals who would not have
bought the album even in the absence of file sharing.
Id. at 3–4.
239. John Borland, RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 8, 2003,
http://news.com.com/ RIAA+sues+261+file+swappers/2100-1023_3-5072564.html.
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However, in December 2003, the RIAA’s lawsuits suffered a significant
setback. In Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet,240
the RIAA’s use of the DMCA to issue subpoenas was held invalid when
applied to entities such as ISPs.241 While this did not completely derail
RIAA’s judicial efforts, it certainly made it more expensive. “The RIAA
would have to file a ‘John Doe’ lawsuit against each anonymous swapper, a
process that would be considerably more labor-intensive and time-consuming.
That in turn could limit the number of people the association ha[d] the
resources to pursue.”242 Nevertheless, the RIAA has sued over 1,900
individual users, with each paying an average of $3000 in fines.243 While it
appeared that the RIAA was making progress, there was still a lack of
enforcement of copyright law, as the RIAA simply could not sue every
individual who illegally downloaded copyrighted files. “The reach of peer-topeer file sharing is enormous, and the attempt to stop millions of people from
file sharing through the use of the court has an enormous scope.”244
The RIAA was unsuccessful in pursuing several legislative alternatives;245
was unsuccessful in the judicial arena,246 as the filing of individual lawsuits
became increasingly expensive; and was generally unsuccessful in its efforts to
utilize the market for solutions. The copyright holders thus had little choice
but to continue its pursuit of P2P software, like Grokster and Napster, by
persuading legislators to introduce the Induce Act. Sen. Hatch, who along with
other co-sponsors of the bill, received significant campaign contributions from
the TV, music, and media industries,247 had been a longtime supporter of artist
rights and is himself a songwriter and a performer.248 The Ninth Circuit’s
240. 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
241. Id. at 1231.
242. John Borland, Court: RIAA Lawsuit Strategy Illegal, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 19, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5129687.html.
243. John Borland, New RIAA File-Swapping Suits Filed, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 23, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5177933.html.
244. Beth A. Thomas, Solutions Are on Track: Digital File Sharing Spun in a Positive Light,
6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 129, 131 (2003).
245. See discussion supra Part III.B; see supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
246. See SLATER ET AL., supra note 234, at AII-10–AII-11 (“One study asserted that P2P
usage dropped by 18 million users after the record industry’s suits began, but other studies
suggest that . . . 75% of people still believe that downloading should not be illegal. The suits
might simply be shifting users toward more secretive systems while angering potential
customers.”).
247. See Help Stop the Induce Act, http://www.savethe.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2006)
(stating that from 1999 to 2005 Sen. Hatch received $158,860 from these industries; other
legislators received the following amounts: Sen. Leahy, $220,450; Sen. Frist, $58,550; Sen.
Boxer, $517,660; Sen. Daschle, $382,760; Sen. Graham, $72,273; and Sen. Clinton, $1,100,390).
248. Jay Rosenthal, Congress Gets it Right, BILLBOARD, July 24, 2004, at 10; see also David
McGuire, Uncertain Landscape Ahead for Copyright Protection, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Dec.
16, 2004, http://washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A4003-2004Dec16?language=printer (stating
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decision allowed Hatch to further push one of his “pet” projects into the
limelight, leading to the introduction of the Induce Act.
However, as outlined above, the Induce Act never made it out of
committee. In an attempt to appease both sides of the debate, the committee
and Copyright Office ended up pleasing neither. These two camps,
represented each by a conglomeration of groups and individuals bound by a
common goal, albeit against one another, wielded enormous power in this
debate, which eventually led to the demise of the proposed legislation.
IV. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In order to conduct a comparative institutional analysis, a policy goal must
first be chosen so the various institutions can be examined through their ability
to promote that chosen goal.249 “To consider institutional choice in depth,
however, one must simplify the social policy goal discussion by assuming the
goal rather than providing a detailed proof.”250 While not taking the social
policy goal for granted, it seems rather constitutionally straightforward, to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”251 This comparative
institutional analysis, when translated with a public choice slant, suggests a
social policy goal of “enabling cost-efficient innovation.”252
A.

Group Formation

An interest group is “an organization of people with similar policy goals
who enter the political process to try to achieve those aims . . . . A policy battle
lost in Congress may be turned around when it comes to bureaucratic

that “the fact that the measure was being debated at all in October before a national election
testified to the power that an influential committee chairman like Hatch has in managing the
legislative agenda”).
249. See Freiwald, supra note 16, at 596–97.
250. Id.
251. U.S. CONST. art. 1 §8, cl.8; Daphne Keller, A Gaudier Future That Almost Blinds the
Eye, 52 DUKE L.J. 273, 297 (2002) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001)).
252. See Brief for Progress & Freedom Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480) (stating that
“consumers have two strong interests: (1) Avoiding inhibitions on technological progress; and (2)
Fostering the production of content by providing incentives to creators”). Note that the social
policy goal is not the goal of either of the two groups per se, but instead the goal of society in
general. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Generally, software distributors and Internet users
champion technology that allows for the dissemination of information, while the copyright
holders are more concerned with that technology being used for illegal purposes. However, both
groups are concerned with rewarding creators for their intellectual and technological
achievements by ensuring the effective distribution of the innovations and providing financial
incentives to continue to innovate. See SLATER ET AL., supra note 234, at 26.
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implementation or the judicial process.”253 Even though there are many
distinct groups within this struggle to adapt copyright law, like the RIAA,
MPAA, and BSA, it is simpler to view all these groups as a single group
lobbying toward a common goal of the protection of copyrights.254 The
combination of the software distributors, Internet service providers, civil
liberty advocates, and Internet users combine to oppose legislation that may
extend the copyright monopoly to the extent that innovation is inhibited.255
Joining the ranks of the software distributors256 are the Internet users,
described as “new grass roots and lobbying organizations advocat[ing] for
consumer and Internet user rights with respect to privacy, intellectual property,
and free speech . . . . these organized actors will likely push the equilibria of
the substantive laws closer to outcomes that benefit Internet users.”257 This is
significant because of the large numbers of individuals who belong to this
informal group. “[T]he millions of users of peer-to-peer networks obviously
place value on their ability to access content that they might otherwise have
purchased . . . consist[ing] of . . . arguably the largest international networks of
illegality in human history.”258
Despite their advancement of an arguably illegitimate political interest,259
this network of Internet users, forming a loosely knit group advocating privacy
and speech rights, invariably subsidized the power of the software
253. LINEBERRY ET AL., supra note 34, at 216.
254. Interestingly, a December 2004 phone survey of artists found that only 52% of artists
said unauthorized file-sharing of music files should be illegal, as compared to 37% who said it
should be legal. MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, ARTISTS,
MUSICIANS AND THE INTERNET, at v (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/
PIP_Artists.Musicians_Report.pdf.
255. See McGuire, supra note 248.
256. The software distributors, as discussed in this Paper, include those that support the Sony
standard. Even though Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and rights advocates are active in this
discussion, their position largely supports those of the Internet users, as ISPs generally do not
want harm to come to their customers. However, the groups, as discussed here, are admittedly an
oversimplification of all the interests involved. For example, even the Association of American
Universities, the American Conservative Union, and the American Library Association support
the defeat of the Induce Act. See Declan McCullagh, Outgunned on Copyright?, CNET
NEWS.COM, Nov. 22, 2004, http://news.com.com/2102-1071_3-5460597.html?tag=st.util.print.
For a discussion of the wide array of Grokster amicus briefs received by the Supreme Court, see
Elizabeth Millard, Supreme Court Flooded with File-Sharing Briefs, NEWSFACTOR.COM, Jan. 27,
2005,
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=75&u=/nf/20050127/tc_nf/30028&printer=1.
257. Aaron Burstein, Will Thomas DeVries, & Peter S. Menell, Foreword: The Rise of
Internet Interest Group Politics, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 15–16, 20 (2004).
258. Id. at 15–16 (citation omitted).
259. See Patrick Ross, File-Sharing Battles Leave Us Out, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 27, 2004,
http://news.com.com/Content+vs.+file+sharers+leaves+us+out/2010-1071_3-5551946.html
(“You want name-calling? File sharers are ‘thieves’ and ‘pirates.’ The Recording Industry
Association of American and the Motion Picture Association of America are ‘evil.’”).
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distributors.260 Of particular interest was the rise of Web sites whose main
agenda is to defeat the Induce Act.261 These groups, consistent with the tenets
of pluralism, organized and rose to the occasion when an important issue
appeared on the agenda of many legislators. For example, in the first week of
the “campaign,” more than 10,000 e-mails and faxes were sent to Congress
demanding revision of the Induce Act.262 Another group recruited over 5,000
volunteers to call members of Congress to express their discontent with the
Induce Act.263 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, aligning with the software
distributors, also recruited another 6,000 individuals to write their senators to
express their discontent with the proposed legislation.264
As to the groups advocating increased copyright protection, their wellfunded efforts translated into a legislative proposal by utilizing the same
resources that ensured the attention of the issue in the first place and making its
way onto the agenda of the legislature. The apparent limitless coffers of these
interests were used to form a strong organization that persuades members of
Congress to vote for pro-copyright protection legislation. However, the
copyright protectors do not persuade with money alone, as the RIAA was also
able to convince 3,000 of their members to e-mail their lawmakers.265
It is apparent that these two coalitions of groups were competing to ensure
the protection of their vested interests, either in rights, as with the software
distributors and Internet users, or in copyrights, as with the copyright holders.
They utilized their resources in an attempt to guarantee the preservation or
reformation of the system to best capitalize on their respective businesses.

260. See id.
261. See, e.g., Corante, http://www.corante.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2004); Legislating IP
(An Intellectual Property Law Blog), http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/ (last accessed Nov. 19,
2004) (formerly the Induce Act Blog); Save Betamax, http://www.savebetamax.org/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2004). However, some feel that a larger, more organized interest group is needed to
combat legislative proposals like the Induce Act. See Jim Rapoza, IT Advocacy Group Still
Needed, EWEEK, Aug. 2, 2004, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1630450,00.asp.
262. Save the iPod Update, http://downhillbattle.org/node/view/314 (last visited Apr. 17,
2006).
263. Save Betamax, http://www.savebetamax.org/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
264. Posting of Kevin Heller to Induce Act Blog, http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/
2004_07_01_archive.html; see also Katie Dean, Techies Talk Tough in D.C., WIRED.COM, Jan.
20, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,66329,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_1 (stating
that while “technology companies haven’t focused much of their attention in Washington.
They’re too busy building new products and keeping up with competition,” these groups have
realized the importance of having influence with legislators); Katie Dean, Battling the Copyright
Big Boys, WIRED.COM, Nov. 30, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,65651,00.html
(discussing the success of technology groups in helping to elect sympathetic legislators, including
the election of five representatives in the last election).
265. Brooks Boliek, H’wood, P2P Operators Watch Hill, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 28, 2004,
at 3.
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The Legislative Institution

As suggested by Komesar,266 the copyright holders, being a minority voice,
and the Internet users and software distributors, invariably composed of more
members, basically counteracted one another to the extent that the Induce Act
failed, as the groups were unable to reach a compromise, especially when the
legislators, out of frustration for the lack of movement on the bill, put the
reconciliation process into the hands of these groups.
This is indicative of “interest group liberalism”: “the role of government is
one of insuring access to the most effectively organized, and of ratifying the
agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing leaders.”267
Jessica Litman, in her book Digital Copyright, described the process as unique
to the development of copyright law:
About one hundred years ago, Congress got into the habit of revising copyright
law by encouraging representatives of the industries affected by copyright to
hash out among themselves what changes needed to be made and then present
Congress with the text of appropriate legislation. By the 1920s, the process
was sufficiently entrenched that whenever a member of Congress came up
with a legislative proposal without going through the cumbersome prelegislative process of multiparty negotiation, the affected industries united to
block the bill. Copyright bills passed only after private stakeholders agreed
with one another on their substantive provisions.268

These established processes tend to result in a legislative process that has
certain characteristics. First, the affected group will not support a bill that
takes away certain rights that are granted by the current status of the particular
law.269 Second, groups attempt to characterize the current status of the law in
their favor, as the current law is where negotiations begin.270 If a group can
cast the current copyright law in its favor, then it has more power at the
bargaining table; if it appears that the group which the law favors is making
concessions to the current law, and hence losing some sort of rights, then it is
more likely to receive more of the rights that it favors in return. Finally, these
“negotiations tend to result in very specific and detailed rules that resolve the
main concerns of the players at that stage of the industry’s history.”271
These tendencies of the formation of copyright law follow logically from
basic interest group theory, all of which aid in the understanding of the
introduction and subsequent failure of the Induce Act. First, according to

266. See supra text accompanying notes 75–76.
267. LOWI, supra note 44, at 51 (emphasis added).
268. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23 (2001).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 24.
271. Pamela Samuelson, Toward a “New Deal” for Copyright in the Information Age, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1488, 1490 (2002).
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interest group liberalism, the role of government in the legislative process is to
graft a compromise between competing groups, which is extremely similar to
the process in which copyright law is formulated, as suggested above.272
However, it appears that the process, as described above, was not followed in
the early stages of the Induce Act. Instead of consulting with the various
groups that would be interested in this legislation, Hatch and Induce’s cosponsors neglected the large number of groups interested in this discussion.273
“The fact is that no one really wants to hear from the P2P networks concerning
IICA. The Induce Act will put P2P out of business, why bother giving them a
seat at the table?”274 Further evidence of the lopsided involvement in the
original drafting of the law was evident when Hatch thanked the Business
Software Alliance for “its invaluable assistance in crafting a bill that protects
existing legitimate technologies” during his introduction of the bill.275
Eventually, many of the interested groups were brought into the
discussion.276 Especially receptive to the various groups was the Copyright
Office draft of the Induce Act, however, the sides were still too far apart on
essential issues.277 As suggested above, these groups would not support a bill
that significantly altered their rights under the current system.278
A subsequent hurdle proved to be the uncertainty of the law, as these
groups would continue to portray the current law as favorable to their
interests.279 Relying on Grokster, Internet users could easily argue that certain
P2P applications are not liable as infringers, as the Ninth Circuit ultimately
ruled.280 Software distributors could point to Sony to support their contention
that certain P2P applications are legal because of their substantial
noninfringing use.281 Finally, the copyright holders could highlight Napster
and In re Aimster to support their contentions that the P2P applications are
being used for illegal purposes and should therefore be secondarily liable.282
This confusion about the current status of the law is exactly why the
copyright holders wanted to pass the legislation, however Induce’s opponents
272. See LOWI, supra note 44, at 51; see also LITMAN, supra note 268, at 23.
273. Posting of Chris Rush Cohen to Induce Act Blog, July 24, 2004,
http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/2004_07_01_archive.html.
274. See id.
275. 150 CONG. REC. S7192 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
276. For a discussion of groups, see supra text accompanying notes 253–65.
277. See Posting of Kevin Heller to Induce Act Blog, Sept. 10, 2004,
http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/2004_07_01_archive.html.
278. LITMAN, supra note 268, at 23.
279. Id.
280. See Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.
2004).
281. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441–42 (1984).
282. See A&M Records, Inc v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001). See
generally In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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wanted more discussion about the bill to ensure that Induce would not take
away certain presently held rights, and therefore the parties were unable to
reach a consensus on the proper language for the bill.283 There was not ample
time in the legislative session to iron out the differences and enact the type of
detailed bill that would be necessary to satisfy all the parties involved.284
It is clear that both sides disposed of a large amount of resources during
the short life of the Induce Act. Discounting the possible effectiveness of the
Induce Act in actually promoting innovation, which was highly disputed, the
introduction of the Act, and all of the costs associated with it, was clearly not
cost-effective. The information costs to the copyright holders were quite
high,285 as the copyright holders spent political capital in ensuring the
introduction and wide-spread support of the bill,286 not to mention the time and
labor that was devoted to the defense of the bill. Although the transaction
costs of the copyright holders were lower, as the free-rider problem was
minimal because the groups were already formed and organized, the costs
associated with the Induce Act were not proportional to the expected social
benefit of promoting innovation.287
While the information and transaction costs for the software distributors is
similar to that of the copyright holders, the Internet users experienced
relatively higher transactional and informational costs when attempting to
influence this legislation. The Internet users suffered from a free-rider
problem, as the motivation for any individual internet user to actually lobby the
government is relatively low, as all users are likely to receive the benefit or
suffer the detriment of the legislation regardless of their involvement.288 The
costs of participating and the expected benefit from such participation is
similar to that of casting a vote. A rational actor does not believe that his vote
actually makes a significant difference in the outcome of an election; similarly,
a rational Internet user probably does not believe that his lobbying efforts
would have a real effect on the outcome of the legislative battle. The costs of

283. See McGuire, supra note 248.
284. See Samuelson, supra note 271, at 1490.
285. It appears that the copyright holders are not limiting their scope to the federal
government, as the California Legislature has proposed jail time for developers of P2P software.
See John Borland, State Bill Could Cripple P2P, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 18, 2005,
http://news.com.com/State%20bill%20could%20cripple%20P2P/2100-1028_3-5540937.html.
286. This was illustrated by the influential co-sponsors of the bill. See supra note 247.
287. The transactional costs of the copyright holders are likely to increase in the next
legislative session, as Sen. Hatch’s term has expired as chairman of the Judiciary Committee; he
was replaced by Sen. Arlen Specter, whose views on the pertinent issues likely to come before the
committee are not entirely clear. See McGuire, supra note 248.
288. See Brief for Progress & Freedom Foundation, supra note 252 (stating that consumers
face a collective action problem, as “each consumer is better off if he or she has total access to
unauthorized file-sharing while every other consumer pays for the music”).
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organizing and reaching other interested Interent users were also rather high, as
this group was not previously formally organized to fight such legislation.
However, the Internet itself played a role in softening the blow of these
high costs. The rather effortless lobbying techniques employed by the Internet
users, like sending an e-mail or posting on a message board, helped to defray
the effect of the free-rider problem and the problem of the expected benefit
from actually lobbying the government. Once the individual was aware of the
legislation and its potential repercussions, the experienced Internet user could
express his political feelings without spending a lot of time or money.289 It is
the relative ease of the Internet that allowed the Internet users to “spend
enough” of their resources to cancel the copyright holders’ efforts. Again, as
Komesar had suggested, a well-organized and well-informed small group, like
the copyright holders, will be more influential than a poorly organized and a
poorly formed large group, like the Internet users. However, when the Internet
users, with the help of the software distributors, organized in such a manner as
to increase their influence, “a countervailance of sorts between the two forces
[resulted] and, with it, political outcomes that [we]re more ‘balanced.’”290
Nevertheless, when examining the relative nominal effect of the Induce
Act on the social policy goal of the promotion of cost-efficient innovation
protection, and the many resources that were spent by the two groups, the
legislative process did not appear to be the effective institution with which to
achieve the social policy goal.
C. The Judiciary
As discussed, the copyright holders have used the judiciary for two main
types of claims: copyright infringement against individual file-sharers and
secondary copyright infringement against those software producers that
facilitate file-sharing. Both of these avenues, however, have high costs for
both the plaintiff and defendant.
Internet users, to avoid suits from the copyright holders, must first
understand that file-sharing is an illegal form of copyright infringement, which
was, at least until recently, a large information cost. While the copyright
holders have decided to shoulder a portion of the educational burden, there are
still Internet users who do not realize that file-sharing is illegal. Further, the
transaction costs forced upon Internet users who were thrust into litigation are
289. Also decreasing the expected information costs of the Internet user, but increasing the
costs of the P2P companies and other potential infringing software, are warnings that are written
into the software that informs the internet user of the repercussions of using the technology to
download copyrighted media. John Borland, FTC Spotlights Proposals on P2P Risks, CNET
NEWS, Dec. 7, 2004, http://news.com.com/2102-1025_3-5482429.html?tag=st.util.print.
290. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 75. But, “[w]here minoritarian influence predominates . . .
the resulting broad-based legislation may be illusory.” Id.; see also Erlanger & Merrill, supra
note 76.
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also quite high; relative to the benefit received, as in possession of illegally
downloaded music or movies, the costs of hiring a lawyer and paying a
settlement are very high. However, Internet users are not altogether deterred
by these suits, as there is a free-rider problem, where not all Internet users who
download pirated media are held accountable for their infringement.
Therefore, many Internet users will continue to receive the benefit of
copyrighted media, while not bearing any of the costs associated with
litigation; as the possibility of being sued is fairly remote, the Internet users
will generally continue to take advantage of the collective good of pirated
media.
The copyright holders also suffer from high transaction and information
costs when utilizing the institution of the judiciary. Transaction costs are high
in almost any legal proceeding, as the many litigation costs continue to build
over the life of the proceedings, which, especially when suing the P2P
networks themselves, seem likely to be appealed several times, and sometimes
on many different issues.291 The copyright holders’ information costs are also
high when suing Internet users, as the “John Doe” subpoena process is
significantly more expensive than the once relied-on power of subpoena found
in the DMCA.
Not only are the costs high, but the expected benefit does not really satisfy
the social policy goal of encouraging cost-efficient innovation. Any court
adjudication is only based on the facts of the particular case, and these
decisions do not promulgate rules which can be enforced without a subsequent
lawsuit. “[C]ourt rulings apply only to the parties involved in the specific
litigation. Stare decisis provides incentives for similarly situated actors to
conform to the ruling, lest they be dragged into court, but such incentives are
inadequate.”292 As seen with the evolution of P2P networks, the Grokster
technology progressed after Napster so as not to fall under the specific facts
that the court determined to be infringement.
This maxim is also illustrated in the inevitable result of the Grokster ruling
by the Supreme Court. Even though the copyright holders arguably won the
case, there is still much uncertainty as to the application of the Court’s
“inducement” theory—uncertainty that will take time to resolve through its
application by lower courts.293 Adding to the uncertain application of the
291. Napster had several different interlocutory appeals, and Grokster will have gone in front
of three separate courts. See supra Part III.A.
292. Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale & Kim Weatherall, Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust
Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 559
(2002).
293. Robert A. Kalinsky & Gregory A. Sebald, Supreme Court’s Inducement Theory in
Grokster Creates Uncertainty,” INTELL. PROP. TODAY (August 2005) (“[T]he opinion leaves
uncertainty regarding what other activity might trigger liability under the new theory. This
uncertainty will require further litigation to define the metes and bounds of active inducement in
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Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement, additional legislation by Congress is
likely if the decision in Grokster ultimately harms technology companies or
consumers.294
The main benefit of litigation against Internet users is education, as the
settlement received is usually nominal in relation to the costs related to the
litigation. Although education of Internet users of the negative effects of
piracy is important, it can be, and certainly is, accomplished through other, less
expensive means. Overall, the nominal benefits received from litigation, when
compared to the relative high costs of pursuing solutions in the judicial
institution, do not effectively allocate resources to accomplish the goal of
securing innovation.295
D. The Market
When a solution is sought within the institution of the market, the
transaction and information costs are significantly less for the Internet users,
and are spent in a manner that best furthers the social goal of encouraging
innovation. First, Internet users’ information costs are lower, as the copyright
holders have decided to educate the Internet users, and, when properly
advertised and targeted to the least knowledgeable Internet users, these
messages would ideally affect the file-sharing population. Internet users might
take on additional information costs if they attempt to design software that
circumvents certain copy-protected media, but this is probably negligible, as
the technological savviness necessary to accomplish such methods is probably
limited to a smaller percentage of Internet users, and will probably never be
eliminated altogether.296 Internet users’ transaction costs are also limited, as
the main cost will be the increased price of media, but these additional costs
are merely a function of the increase in price from nothing to the current
market value, and from a consumer’s perspective, should be expected.
copyright law.”). Questions such as “When will a tech company know whether it will be held
responsible for the infringements of a third party user?” and “How can we protect innovators
from the threat . . . of lawsuits based on uncertainties?” demonstrate such uncertainty. Christine
Mumford, Panelists Unable to Agree on Propriety of Legislative Involvement in Grokster’s Wake,
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., July 22, 2005, at 362, 362 (quoting Fred von Lohmann of
the Electronic Frontier Foundation).
294. See Alexei Alexis, Congress Expected to Examine Supreme Court File-Sharing Case,
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., July 1, 2005, at 260.
295. Nevertheless, just days after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grokster, the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) filed another round of lawsuits, this time against
other decentralized P2P networks such as BitTorrent and eDonkey. Xeni Jardin, Hollywood
Wants BitTorrent Dead, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 14, 2004, http://wired.com/news/digiwood/
0,1412,66034,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_2.
296. But see Ed Felten, Tiny P2P, http://freedom-to-tinker.com/tinyp2p.html (last visited Apr.
10, 2006) (displaying the code for a “tiny” P2P application, to illustrate the simplistic nature of
the code, noting that “any moderately skilled programmer can write one”).
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However, the transaction and information costs of copyright holders are
still high, at least initially. Developing either a new business model or
technology that helps to ensure copyright protection will increase information
costs. The advertising campaigns used to educate Internet users also keep
transaction costs high, with the success of such advertising depending on the
relative knowledge of the consumer. Nevertheless, transaction costs will most
likely slowly decrease with a new business model, which utilizes the Internet,
as it would inevitably be less expensive than relying on retail establishments to
peddle the goods of copyright owners.297 More importantly, these costs will
lead directly to the social policy goal. As the proposed restriction will be
imposed only on media originating from copyright holders, other innovators
will not have to be concerned with overbroad legislation or confusing court
opinions. By only modifying CDs and DVDs, and not developing a new form
of liability like that found in the Induce Act, innovation itself will not be
stifled. Instead, file-sharing, being the targeted activity that these measures
attempted to prevent, will decrease as the technologies become increasingly
advocated for, advanced, and accepted. In reality, while file-sharing might be
moderately discouraged through market measures, the real hindrance to P2P
file-sharing would be the increased difficulty in exchanging copyrighted
material, making it less desirable to the rational actor.
Through the use of the market, Internet users might lose their ability to
gain access to free music and movies, at least with the present ease, but
software distributors will not be stifled or discouraged from releasing new
programs and devices. By stemming the reason for and the ease of file
sharing, what could be possible “infringing” devices and programs could be
used solely for their “substantially non-infringing use,” and at the same time
not stifle innovation.
V. CONCLUSION
The American legislative process is not designed for efficiency. The
American judicial system is not designed to promulgate effective, enforceable
rules to cure social ills. In fact, influencing either of these institutions has
certain built-in costs with unpredictable benefits. Copyright legislation,
because of its intricacies and intimate involvement in many markets, inevitably
has many suitors. It is exactly because of the number of interests, their fervor
for their positions, and the vast amount of money at stake that these interests
often clash, thus resulting in more gridlock. Copyright litigation, while not

297. Currently, Wal-Mart, Target, and Best Buy are responsible for over 50% of the retail
business of CDs. Michael Geist, Numbers Don’t Crunch Against Downloading, TORONTO STAR,
Nov. 29, 2004, at D2; see also SLATER ET AL., supra note 234, at 7 (“[T]he Internet enables low
cost distribution among content creators, retailers, and consumers, perhaps eliminating the need
for standalone retailers altogether.”).
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necessarily subject to group pressure, does not cast a wide net, and only affects
the parties in the lawsuit. While groups certainly play a role in adjudications,
as a wealthy litigant could assemble a large and talented legal team, thus
making resolution more difficult, the rule of law governs more in the judicial
system, which is virtually impossible to change without help from judicial
confusion and the subsequent perversion of current law.
The market, however, is less subject to group pressure. Copyright holders
are free to employ whatever business model or technology they desire, and the
only guiding light is profitability. In the market, Internet users merely turn into
consumers. Once the enemy of the copyright holder, they are now a highly
desired commodity. High costs of frequent litigation and tireless lobbying of
Congress are discarded. Nevertheless, there will undoubtedly be times, even
when operating solely under the institution of the market, that access to the
legislature or judiciary will be necessary. However, these branches were not
designed to merely rubber-stamp policy desires of only private interests;
money and influence is often needed to succeed, and, as shown, sometimes
even that is not enough. However, in order for businesses to reshape their
models in the digital age, the law must be settled and understood.298
Unfortunately, a vicious cycle seems to be forming: For businesses to
understand what they are trying to protect against, the lines of legality need to
be drawn, as this will allow the copyright holders to propose market solutions
that will enable protection of their copyrights while not discouraging
innovation, but this cannot be done with any certainty until the institutions of
the legislature and judiciary remain quiet for at least a short time.
BEN ARANDA

298. Unfortunately, with the Court’s recent decision in Grokster II, this might not be the case,
as it will inevitably take lower courts precious time to understand and apply the law as suggested
by the Court. See Jeffrey D. Neuburger & Maureen E. Garde, What’s Left of Substantial
Noninfringing Use After Grokster?, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Sept. 16, 2005, at 549,
549 (“The court in Grokster left reconsideration of Sony ‘for another day.’ That leaves a
substantial amount of confusion on just how the Sony test should be applied until that day
arrives.”).
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